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The Maritime provinces of Canada in 1870 probably came the closest of any 
region to representing the classic ideal of the staple economy. Traditionally 
shaped by the Atlantic community, the region's industrial sector had been" 
structured to the production and export of timber, lumber products, fish and 
ships. The last was of crucial significance. In terms of the balance of trade, it 
accounted for more than one-third of New Brunswick's exports at Confedera-
tion. In human terms, the manufacture of ships provided a number of towns 
with large groups of highly skilled, highly paid craftsmen who were able to 
contribute significantly to the quality of community life. Against this back-
ground, the constricting British market for lumber and ships after 1873 created 
a serious economic crisis for the area. This was not in itself unusual. Through-
out the nineteenth century the region's resource-based economy had suffered 
a series of periodic recessions as the result of changing imperial policies and 
world markets. Yet, in one respect, this crisis differed from all earlier; while 
the lumber markets gradually returned in the late 1870's. the ship market did 
not. NovaScotians continued to build their small vessels for the coasting trade, 
but the large ship building industry failed to revive. 
In the face of this uncertain future the National Policy was embraced by 
much of the Maritime business community as a new mercantilism which would 
re-establish that stability which the region had enjoyed under the old British 
order. In the first years of its operation the Maritimes experienced a dramatic 
growth in manufacturing potential, a growth often obscured by the stagnation 
of both the staple industries and population growth. In fact, the decade follow-
ing 1879 was characterized by a significant transfer of capital and human re-
sources from the traditional staples into a new manufacturing base which was 
emerging in response to federal tariff policies. This development was so sig-
nificant that between 1881 and 1891 the industrial growth rate of Nova Scotia 
outstripped all other provinces in eastern Canada! The comparative growth 
1 Nova Scotia's industrial output increased 66 percent between 1880 and 1890: that of Ontario 
and Quebec by 51 percent each. Canada. Census 119011. III. pp. 272. 283. Bertram estimates that 
the per capita value of Nova Scotia's industrial output rose from 57.8 percent to 68.9 percent of 
the national average during the period. Gordon Bertram. "Historical Statistics on Growth and 
Structure of Manufacturing in Canada 1870-1957", Canadian Political Science Association Con-
ference on Statistics 1962 and 1963. Report, p. 122. 
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of the period is perhaps best illustrated in St. John. The relative increase in 
industrial capital, average wages, and output in this community significantly 
surpassed that of Hamilton, the Canadian city whose growth was perhaps most 
directly attributable to the protective tariff.2 
Within the Atlantic region the growth of the 1880's was most unequally dis-
tributed. It centred not so much on areas or sub-regions as upon widely scat-
tered communities? These included the traditional Atlantic ports of St. John, 
Halifax, and Yarmouth Numbering and ship building towns, notably St. Stephen 
and New Glasgow; and newer railroad centres, such as Moncton and Amherst. 
The factors which produced this curious distribution of growth centres were 
human and historical rather than geographic. The one characteristic shared 
by them all was the existence in each of a group of entrepreneurs possessing 
the enterprise and the capital resources necessary to initiate the new industries. 
Strongly community-oriented, these entrepreneurs attempted, during the 
course of the 1880's, to create viable manufacturing enterprises in their local 
areas under the aegis of the protective tariff. Lacking the resources to survive 
the prolonged economic recessions of the period, and without a strong regional 
metropolis, they acquiesced in the 1890's to the industrial leadership of the 
Montreal business community. Only at the century's end, with the expansion 
of the consolidation movement, did a group of Halifax financiers join their 
Montreal counterparts in asserting an industrial metropolitanism over the com-
munities of the eastern Maritimes. This paper is a study in that transition. 
I 
The Maritime business community in the 1870's was dominated by three 
groups: wholesale shippers, lumber and ship manufacturers, and the small scale 
manufacturers of a variety of commodities for purely local consumption. As a 
group they were deeply divided on the question of whether the economic sal-
vation of their various communities was to be found in the maintenance of an 
Atlantic mercantile system, or in a programme of continentalist-oriented in-
dustrial diversification. A wedding of the two alternatives appeared to be the 
ideal situation. While they had warily examined the proposed tariff of 1879, 
most leading businessmen accepted its philosophy and seriously attempted to 
adapt it to their community needs* 
2 Canada, Census (1901). III. pp. 326-9. The increase between 1880 and 1890 was as follows: 
St. John Hamilton 
Population —3% 34% 
Industrial Capital 125% 69% 
Industrial Workers 118% 48% 
Average Annual Wage 12% 2% 
Value of Output 98% 71% 
3 See Table I. 
4 For a sampling of business opinion on the National Policy see K. P. Burn's reply to Peter Mitchell 
in the tariff debate of 1883, Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1883, pp. 551-2; the opinion 
of Josiah Wood, ibid.. pp. 446-8; and the view of John F. Stairs, ibid.. 1885, pp. 641-9. 
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TABLE I 
Industrial Development in Principal Maritime Centres 1880-1890 
Halifax 11880) 
Dartmouth (1890) 
St. John 11880) 
(1890) 
New Glasgow (1880) 
(1890) 
St. Stephen (1880) 
Milltown (1890) 
Moncton(l880) 
(1890) 
Fredericton- ( 1880) 
Marysville ($890) 
Yarmouth (1880) 
(1890) 
Amherst (1880) 
(1890) 
Population 
39.886 
43.132 
41.353 
39.179 
2.595 
3,777 
4.002 
4,826 
5.032 
8.765 
7.218* 
8.394 
3.485 
6.089 
2.274 
3.781 
Industrial 
Capital Employees 
$2,975,000 
6.346.000 
2.143.000 
4.838.000 
160.000 
1.050,000 
136.000 
1.702,000 
530.000 
1.134.000 
1.090.000' 
2.133,000 
290,000 
783,000 
81.000 
457.000 
3.551 
4.654 
2.690 
5.888 
360 
1.117 
447 
1.197 
603 
948 
91P 
1.526 
211 
930 
288 
683 
Average 
Annual 
W'açes 
$303 
280 
278 
311 
255 
355 
314 
320 
418 
333 
221« 
300 
328 
312 
281 
293 
Output 
$6.128.000 
8.235.000 
4.123.000 
8.131.000 
313.000 
1.512.000 
573.000 
1.494.000 
1.719.000 
1.973.000 
1.031.000» 
1.578,000 
284,000 
1.234.000 
283.000 
724,000 
Industry by-
Output 11891 > 
Sugar** 
Rope* 
Cotton 
Confectionary 
Paint 
Lamps 
Lumber** 
Machinery*** 
Smelting 
Rope**" 
Cottons 
Brass* 
Nails* 
Elect. Light** 
Primary Steel* 
Rolling Mills** 
Glass 
Cottons 
Confectionary 
Fish Canning 
Soap 
Lumber 
Sugar 
Cottons 
Woolens 
Rolling Stock 
Cottons 
Lumber 
Foundry Product 
Cotton Yarn* 
Fish Canning 
Woolens 
Foundry Product 
Shoes 
Doors 
a Estimates. Marysville was not an incorporated town in 1880, and totals for that date must be 
estimated from York County figures. 
* Leading Canadian Producer; ** second: *** third. 
Source: Canada. Census (1891). III. Table I: Ibid.. (1901). III. Tables XX, XXI. 
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For a variety of reasons the tariff held the promise of prosperity for the 
region's traditional commercial activities and. as well, offered the possibilities 
for the development of new manufacturing industry. For most Nova Scotian 
business leaders the West Indies market was vital to the successful functioning 
of the province's commercial economy. It was a major element in the region's 
carrying trade and also provided the principal market for the Nova Scotia 
fishing industry. These, in turn, were the foundations of the provincial ship-
building industry. The successful prosecution of the West Indies trade, how-
ever. depended entirely upon the ability of the Nova Scotia merchants to 
dispose of the islands' sugar crop. The world depression in the 1870's had re-
sulted in a dramatic decline in the price of refined sugar as French. German, 
British and American refineries dumped their surplus production on a glutted 
world market. By 1877 more than nine-tenths of Canadian sugar was obtained 
from these sources.5 a fact which threatened the Nova Scotia carrying trade 
with disaster. A significant tariff on foreign sugar, it was felt, would encourage 
the development of a Canadian refining industry which would acquire all of 
its raw sugar from the British West Indies. Through this means, most Nova 
Scotian wholesalers and shippers saw in the new policy an opportunity both 
to resuscitate the coastal shipping industry of the province and to restore their 
primacy in the West Indies. 
Of the newer industries which the National Policy offered, the future for the 
Maritimes seemed to lie in textiles and iron and steel products. The optimism 
concerning the possibilities of the former appears to have emerged out of a hope 
of emulating the New England experience. This expectation was fostered by 
the willingness of British and American cotton mill machinery manufacturers 
to supply on easy terms the necessary duty-free equipment, and by the feeling 
of local businessmen that the market provided by the tariff and the low quality 
labour requirements of such an enterprise would guarantee that a profitable 
business could be erected and maintained by the efforts of a single community. 
Behind such reasoning lay the general assumption that, despite major trans-
portation problems, the Maritimes, and notably Nova Scotia, would ultimately 
become the industrial centre of Canada. The assumption was not unfounded. 
The region contained the only commercially viable coal and iron deposits in 
the Dominion, and had the potential, under the tariff, of controlling most of 
the Montreal fuel sources. Under these circumstances the development of 
textiles and the expansion of most iron and steel industries in the Atlantic area 
was perhaps not a surprising project. 
Despite a cautious enthusiasm for the possibilities offered by the new federal 
economic dispensation, there was considerable concern about the organiza-
tional and financial problems in creating a new industrial structure. The Mari-
times was a region of small family firms with limited capital capabilities. Other 
5 Quoted by J. F. Stairs in the tariff debate of 1886. Canada. House of Commons. Debates. 1886. 
p. 775. 
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than chartered banks, it lacked entirely the financial structure to support any 
large corporate industrial entity. Like the people of Massachusetts. Maritimers 
were traditionally given to placing their savings in government savings banks at 
a guaranteed 4 percent interest than in investments on the open market! Re-
gional insurance, mortgage and loan, and private savings corporations were vir-
tually unknown. The result was to throw the whole financial responsibility for 
undertaking most manufactories upon the resources of individual entrepreneurs. 
Since most enterprises were envisioned as being of general benefit to the 
community at large, and since few businessmen possessed the necessary capital 
resources to single-handedly finance such an undertaking, most early industrial 
development occurred as the result of co-operative efforts by groups of com-
munity entrepreneurs. These in turn were drawn from a traditional business 
elite of wholesalers and lumbermen. In Halifax as early as May. 1879. a com-
mittee was formed from among the leading West Indies shippers "to solicit 
capital, select a site and get a manufacturing expert" for the organization of a 
sugar refinery! Under its leadership $500,000 was raised, in individual sub-
scriptions of $10-20.000, from among members of the Halifax business com-
munity. This procedure was repeated during the formation of the Halifax Cot-
ton Company in 1881: more than $300,000 was subscribed in less than two 
weeks, most of it by thirty-two individuals! 
The leadership in the development of these enterprises was taken by young 
members of traditional mercantile families. The moving spirit in both cases 
was Thomas Kenny. A graduate of the Jesuit Colleges at Stonyhurst (England) 
and St. Gervais (Belgium). Kenny had inherited from his father, the Hon. Sir 
Edward Kenny. M.L.C.. one of the largest wholesale shipping firms in the 
region. In the early 1870's the younger Kenny had invested heavily in shipyards 
scattered throughout five counties of Nova Scotia, and had even expanded into 
England with the establishment of a London branch for his firm. Following the 
opening of the refinery in 1881. he devoted an increasingly large portion of his 
time to the management of that firm! Kenny was supported in his efforts by 
a number of leading merchants including the Hon. Robert Boak. Scottish-born 
president of the Legislative Council, and John F. Stairs, Manager of the Dart-
mouth Rope Works. Stairs, who had attended Dalhousie University, was a 
member of the executive council of Nova Scotia, the son of a legislative coun-
cillor. and a grandson of the founder of the shipping firm of William Stairs, 
Son and Morrow Limited!0 
6 Monetary Times. 4 June. 6 September 1886. Forty-five of the fifty savings banks in the Dominion 
were located in the Maritimes. 
7 Monetary Times. 16 May 1879. 
8 Monetary Times. 20 May 1881. 
9 George M. Rose. ed.. Cyclopedia of Canadian Biography i Toronto. 1886-8). II. pp. 729-31 
(henceforth cited as CCB). 
10 Encyclopedia of Canadian Biography (Montreal. 1904-7). I. p. 86: CCB. II. p. 155: W. J. Stairs. 
History of Stairs Morrow i Halifax. 1906). pp. 5-6. 
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In contrast to Halifax, St. John had always been much more a manufacturing 
community and rivalled Ottawa as the principal lumber manufacturing centre 
in the Dominion. Development in the New Brunswick city occurred as new 
growth on an existing industrial structure and centred on cotton cloth and iron 
and steel products. The New Brunswick Cotton Mill had been erected in 1861 
by an Ulster-born St. John shipper. William Parks, and his son. John H. Parks. 
The latter, who had been trained as a civil engineer under the tutelage of the 
chief engineer of the European and North American Railroad, assumed the 
sole proprietorship of the mill in 1870Î1 In 1881 he led the movement among 
the city's dry goods wholesalers to establish a second cotton mill which was 
incorporated as the St. John Cotton Company. 
The principal St. John iron business was the firm of James Harris. Trained 
as a blacksmith, the Annapolis-born Harris had established a small machine 
shop in the city in 1828, and had expanded into the foundry business some 
twenty-three years later. In 1883. in consequence of the new tariff, he deter-
mined to develop a completely integrated secondary iron industry including 
a rolling mill and railway car plant. To provide the resources for the expansion, 
the firm was reorganized as a joint stock company with a $300,000 capital most 
of which was raised by St. John businessmen. The New Brunswick Foundry, 
Rolling Mills and Car Works, with a plant covering some five acres of land, 
emerged as the largest industrial employer in the Maritimes.'2 The success 
of the Harris firm induced a group of wholesale hardware manufacturers under 
the leadership of the Hon. Isaac Burpee, a former member of the Mackenzie 
Government, to re-establish the Coldbrook Rolling Mills near the city. 
Yet, despite the development of sugar and cotton industries and the expan-
sion of iron and rope manufactories, the participation of the St. John and 
Halifax business communities in the industrial impulse which characterized 
the early 1880's can only be described as marginal. Each group played the role 
of participant within its locality but neither provided any positive leadership 
to its hinterland area. Even in terms of industrial expansion, the performance 
of many small town manufacturers was more impressive than that of their 
city counterparts. 
At the little railway centre of Moncton. nearly $1,000,000 was raised under 
the leadership of John and Christopher Harris, John Humphrey, and Josiah 
Woods, to permit the construction of a sugar refinery, a cotton mill, a gas light 
and power plant, and several smaller iron and textile enterprises. The Harris 
brothers, sons of an Annapolis ship builder of Loyalist extraction, had estab-
lished a shipbuilding and shipping firm at Moncton in 1856.° Under the aegis 
of their firm they organized the new enterprises with the assistance of their 
11 Canadian Biographical Dictionary (Montreal. 1880-1 >. II. pp. 684-5 (henceforth cited as CBD); 
Parks Family Papers. F. no. 1. New Brunswick Museum. 
12 CBD, II, pp. 684-5: Monetary Times. 27 April 1883. 22 June 1888. 
13 CCB. II. pp. 186-7. 86. 
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brother-in-law John Humphrey, scion of Yorkshire Methodist settlers of the 
Tantramar. longtime M.L. A. for Westmorland, and proprietor of the Moncton 
flour and woolen mills. They were financially assisted in their efforts by Josiah 
Wood (later Senator) of nearby Sackville. The son of a Loyalist wholesaler. 
Wood first completed his degrees (B.A., M.A.) at Mount Allison, was later 
admitted to the New Brunswick bar. and finally entered his father's shipping 
and private banking business.1* The leadership of the Moncton group was so 
effective that the owner of the Monetary Times, in a journey through the re-
gion in 1882. singled out the community for praise: 
Moncton has industrialized . . . business people only in moderate circum-
stances but have united their energies . . . persons who have always invested 
their surplus funds in mortgages are now cheerfully subscribing capital for 
the Moncton Cotton Co. Unfortunately for industrial progress, there are too 
many persons [in this region] who are quite content with receiving 5 or 6% 
for their money so long as they know it is safe, rather than risk it in manu-
factures, even supposing it yielded double the profit!5 
At St. Stephen the septuagenarian lumber barons and bankers, James Murchie 
and Freeman Todd, joined the Annapolis-born ship builder, Zechariah Chip-
man, who was father-in-law to the Minister of Finance, Sir Leonard Tilley, in 
promoting an immense cotton concern, the St. Croix, second largest in the 
Dominion at the time. The son of a local farmer, Murchie, whose holdings 
included more than 200.000 acres of timber lands — half of it in Quebec —, also 
developed a number of smaller local manufactories.10 At the same time two 
young brothers. Gilbert and James Ganong, grandsons of a Loyalist farmer 
from die St. John Valley, began the expansion of their small confectionery 
firm,17 and shortly initiated construction of a soap enterprise in the town. 
At Yarmouth a group of ship builders and West Indies merchants led by the 
Hon. Loran Baker, M.L.C., a shipper and private banker, and John Lovitt, a 
shipbuilder and member of the Howland Syndicate, succeeded in promoting 
the Yarmouth Woolen Mill, the Yarmouth Cotton Manufacturing, the Yar-
mouth Duck Yarn Company, two major foundries, and a furniture enterprise.18 
The development was entirely an internal community effort — virtually all 
the leading business figures were third generation Nova Scotians of pre-Loyalist 
!4 CCB. II. pp. 354-5: CBD. II. p. 693; Henry J. Morgan, ed.. Canadian Men and Women of the 
Time (Toronto. 1898), p. 1000. 
15 Monetary Times, 16 December 1882. 
16 CCB. II. pp. 221-2: CBD. II. pp. 674-5: Harold Davis. An International Community on the St. 
Croix (1604-1930) (Orono. 1950). chapter 18: Monetary Times, 1 August 1890. 
17 Canada, Sessional Papers. 1885. no. 37. pp. 174-97. 
18 Monetary Times. 11 December 1885: Canadian Journal of Commerce, 3 June 1881: CBD. II. 
pp. 409-10. 510: Canadian Men and Women of the Time (1898), p. 44. 
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American origins. A similar development was discernible in the founding of 
the Windsor Cotton Company!9 
A somewhat different pattern emerged at New Glasgow, the centre of the 
Nova Scotia coal industry. Attempts at the manufacture of primary iron and steel 
had been made with indifferent results ever since Confederation.20 In 1872. 
a New Glasgow blacksmith. Graham Fraser, founded the Hope Iron Works 
with an initial capital of $160.000?' As the tariff on iron and steel products 
increased in the 1880's so did the vertical expansion of the firm. In 1889. when 
it was amalgamated with Fräsers other enterprise, the Nova Scotia Forge 
Company, more than two-thirds of the $280.000 capital stock of the resulting 
Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company was held by the citizens of New Glas-
gow.22 Fraser remained as president and managing director of the corporation 
until 1904.23 during which time it produced most of the primary steel in the 
Dominion.24 and remained one of the largest industrial corporations in the 
country.25 
Fraser was seconded in his industrial efforts by James Carmichael of New 
Glasgow and John F. Stairs of Halifax. Carmichael. son of a prominent New 
Glasgow merchant and a descendant of the Scottish founders of Pictou. had 
established one of the largest ship building and shipping firms in the province.26 
Stairs' investment in the New Glasgow iron and steel enterprise represented 
one of the few examples of inter-community industrial activity in this period. 
The most unusual pattern of manufacturing development in the region was 
that initiated at Fredericton by Alexander Gibson. Gibson's distinctiveness lay 
in his ability to impose the tradition and structure of an earlier semi-industrial 
society onto a changing pattern of development. A St. Stephen native and the 
son of Ulster immigrants, he had begun his career as a sawyer, and later oper-
ated a small lumber firm at Lepreau. In 1865 he bought from the Anti-Con-
federationist government of A. J. Smith extensive timber reserves on the head-
waters of the Nashwaak River.27 and at the mouth of that river, near Frederic-
ton, built his own mill-town of Marysville. Freed from stumpage fees by his 
fortunate purchase, the "lumber king of New Brunswick" was producing as 
19 Canadian Journal of Commerce. 10 June 1881. 
20 W. J. A. Donald. The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry (Boston. 1915). chapter 3. 
21 Monetary Times. 28 April 1882. 
22 The Canadian Manufacturer and Industrial World. 3 May 1889 (henceforth cited as Canadian 
Manufacturer). 
23 Henry J- Morgan, ed.. Canadian Men and Women of the Time (Toronto. 1912). p. 419: C. W. 
Parker, ed.. Who's Who and Why \ Vancouver. 1916). VI & VII, p. 259 (hereafter cited as WWW). 
24 Canadian Manufacturer. 1 April 1892. 
25 Ibid.. 7 March 1890. 
26 CBD. II. pp. 534-5. 
27 A. G. Bailey. 'The Basis and Persistence of Opposition to Confederation in New Brunswick." 
Canadian Historical Review. XXIII (1942). p. 394. 
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much as 100,000.000 feet of lumber annually by the 1880's —about one third of 
the provincial output. His lumber exports at times comprised half the export 
commerce of the port of St. John?8 
One of the wealthiest industrial entrepreneurs in the Dominion. Gibson 
determined in 1883 to undertake the erection of a major cotton enterprise 
entirely under his own auspices.29 He erected one of the largest brick-yards 
in the Dominion and personally supervised the construction of the plant which 
was opened in 1885.30 In that same year he employed nearly 2,000 people in 
his sundry enterprises.31 By 1888 his sales of cotton cloth totalled nearly 
$500,000.32 That same year the Gibson empire, comprising the cotton mill. 
timber lands, saw mills, lath mills, the town of Marysville, and the Northern 
and Western Railroad, was formed into a joint stock company, its $3,000.000 
capital controlled by Gibson, his brother, sons and son-in-law. 
Several common characteristics distinguished the men who initiated the 
industrial expansion of the 1880's. They were, on the whole, men of substance 
gained in traditional trades and staples. They sought a substantial, more secure 
future for themselves within the framework of the traditional community 
through the instrumentality of the new industrial mercantilism. Averaging 
fifty-four years of age, they were old men to be embarking upon new careers.33 
Coupled with this factor of age was their ignorance of both the technical skills 
and the complexities of the financial and marketing structures involved in the 
new enterprises. 
The problem of technical skill was overcome largely by the importation of 
management and skilled labour, mainly from England and Scotland.34 The 
problem of finance was more serious. The resources of the community entre-
preneurs were limited; the costs of the proposed industry were almost always 
far greater than had been anticipated. Moreover, most businessmen had only 
the vaguest idea of the quantity of capital required to operate a large manu-
facturing corporation. Promoters generally followed the normal mercantile 
practice and raised only sufficient capital to construct and equip the physical 
plant, preferring to finance operating costs through bank loans — a costly and 
inefficient process. The Halifax Sugar Refinery perhaps best illustrated these 
28 Monetary Times, 9 January 1885. 
29 Ibid.. 11 May 1883. 
30 Our Dominion. Historical and Other Sketches of the Mercantile Interests of Fredericton. 
Marysville. Woodstock, Moncton. Yarmouth, etc. (Toronto. 1889), pp. 48-54. 
31 Canada. Sessional Papers. 1885. no. 37. pp. 174-97. 
32 Canada. Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital {1889). Evidence. II. p. 448. 
33 American industrial leaders of the same period averaged 45 years. See W. F. Gregory and 
I. D. New. "The American Industrial Elite in the 1870's: Their Social Origins". in William Miller. 
ed.. Men in Business (Cambridge. 1952), p. 197. 
34 Canada. Royal Commission of the Relations of Labour and Capital. Evidence. II. pp. 256, 458 
and III. pp. 78. 238. 249: Canadian Manufacturer. 24 August 1883: Monetary Times. 17 June 1887. 
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problems. When first proposed in 1879 it was to have been capitalized at 
$300,000. Before its completion in 1881 it was re-capitalized twice to a value 
of $500,000. Even this figure left no operating capital, and the refinery 
management was forced to secure these funds by loans from the Merchants 
Bank of Halifax. At the end of its first year of operation the bank debt of the 
corporation totalled $460.000f which immediately became a fixed charge on 
the revenues of the infant industry. Fearing bankruptcy, the stockholders in-
creased their subscriptions and kept the business functioning until 1885 when 
they attempted a solution to the problem by issuing debenture stock to a value 
of $350,000 of which the bank was to receive $200,000 in stock and $50,000 
cash in settlement of debts still owed to it.37 
While many industries received their initial financing entirely from local 
capitalists, some projects proved to be such ambitious undertakings that aid 
had to be sought from other sources. The St. Croix Cotton Company at St. 
Stephen, for example, was forced to borrow $300,000 from Rhode Island in-
terests to complete their huge plant?8 Some industries came to rely so heavily 
on small community banks for perpetual loans for operating expenses that any 
general economic crisis toppled both the industries and the banks simultane-
ously. The financing of James Domville's enterprises, including the Coldbrook 
Rolling Mills, was a contributing factor in the temporary suspension of the 
Maritime Bank of St. John in 1880,39 while such industrial loans ultimately 
brought down the Bank of Yarmouth in 190540 
II 
The problem of industrial finance was intricately tied to a whole crisis of 
confidence in the new order which began to develop as the first enthusiastic 
flush of industrial expansion paled in the face of the general business downturn 
which wracked the Canadian economy in the mid-1880's. At the heart of this 
problem was a gradual deterioration of the British lumber market, and the 
continued shift from sea borne to railroad commerce. Under the influence of 
an increasingly prohibitive tariff and an extended railroad building programme 
a two cycle inter-regional trading pattern was gradually emerging. The west-
ward cycle, by rail into the St. Lawrence basin, left the region with a heavy 
trade imbalance as the central Canadians rapidly replaced British and Amer-
ican produce in the Maritime market with their own flour and manufactured 
materials.41 In return, the region shipped to Montreal quantities of primary 
35 Monetary Times. 18 March 1881. 
36 Ibid.. 17 February 1882. 
37 Ibid.. 19 March 1886. 
38 Canadian Journal of Commerce. 26 October 1883. 
39 Monetary Times. 18 October 1880. 
40 Ibid.. 10 May 1905. 
41 Ibid.. 8 January 1886. 
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and primary manufactured products of both local and imported origins. The 
secretaries of the Montreal and St. John boards of trade estimated the extent 
of this inter-regional commerce at about $15,711,000 in 1885, more than 70 
percent of which represented central Canadian exports to the Maritimes.42 By 
contrast the external trade cycle moved in traditional fashion by ship from the 
principal Maritime ports to Great Britain and the West Indies. Heavily balanced 
in favour of the Maritimes, it consumed most of the output of the region's 
resource industries. The two cycles were crucially interdependent; the Mari-
time business community used the credits earned in the external cycle to meet 
the gaping deficits incurred in the central Canadian trade. The system worked 
as long as the equilibrium between the two could be maintained. Unfortunately, 
as the decade progressed, this balance was seriously threatened by a declining 
English lumber market.*3 
In the face of this increasingly serious trade imbalance, the Maritime business 
community became more and more critical of what they regarded as the sub-
version of the National Policy by central Canadian interests. Their argument 
was based upon two propositions. If Canadian transportation policy was dedi-
cated to creating an all-Canadian commercial system, then this system should 
extend not from the Pacific to Montreal, but from the Pacific to the Atlantic. 
How. in all justice, could the Montreal interests insist on the construction, at 
a staggering cost, of an all-Canadian route west of that city and then demand 
the right to export through Portland or Boston rather than using the Maritime 
route? This argument was implicit in almost every resolution of the Halifax 
and St. John boards of trade from 1880 onward.4* 
The second proposition maintained that, as vehicles of nationhood, the rail-
ways must be considered as a means of promoting national economic integra-
tion rather than as commercial institutions. The timing of this doctrine is 
significant. Before 1885 most Maritime manufacturers were competitive both 
with Canadian and foreign producers. Nails, confectionery, woolens, leather, 
glass, steel and machinery manufactured in the Maritimes normally had large 
markets in both central Canada and the West45 The recession of 1885 reached 
a trough in 1886.48 Diminishing demand coupled with over-production, par-
ticularly in the cotton cloth and sugar industries, resulted in falling prices, and 
made it increasingly difficult for many Maritime manufacturers to retain their 
42 Monetary Times. 30 January 1885. Principal Maritime imports from Central Canada included 
flour, shoes, clothing, textiles, alcoholic beverages and hardware: exports to Quebec and Ontario 
centered on sugar, coal, cotton cloth, iron and fish. 
43 Exports of New Brunswick lumber declined from 404.000.000 board feet in 1883 to 250.000.000 
feet in 1887. Monetary Times. 9 January 1885. 2 and 7 January 1887. 21 January 1898. 
44 See particularly. Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Dominion Board of Trade 
( 1879). pp. 65-73: Monetary Times. 27 January 1882: Minute Book of the St. John Board of Trade 
11879-87). 14 October 1887. New Brunswick Museum. 
45 Canada. Sessional Papers. 1885. no. 34. pp. 86-125. 
46 Bertram, p. 131. 
14 Acadiensis 
central Canadian markets. The bête noir was seen as the relatively high freight 
rates charged by the Intercolonial Railway. The issue came to a head late in 
1885 with the closing of the Moncton and the two Halifax sugar refineries. The 
response of the Halifax manufacturers was immediate and decisive. Writing to 
the Minister of Railways, John F. Stairs enunciated the Maritime interpreta-
tion of the National Policy: 
Four refineries have been set in operation in the Lower Provinces by the 
policy of the Government. This was right; but trade having changed so that 
it is now impossible for them to work prosperously it is the duty of the Gov-
ernment to accomodate its policy to the change. The reduction in freight 
rates asked for is necessary to this . . . . If in answer to this you plead that 
you must manage so that no loss occur running the I.C.R., we will reply, we 
do not, and will not accept this as a valid plea from the Government. . . and 
to it we say that the people of Nova Scotia, nor should those of Ontario and 
Quebec, for they are as much interested, even admit it is essential to make 
both ends meet in the finance of the railroad, when it can only be done at 
the expense of inter-provincial trade, and the manufacturers of Nova Scotia 
. . . . How can the National Policy succeed in Canada where such great 
distances exist between the provinces unless the Government who control 
the National Railway meet the requirements of trade . . .47 
At stake, as Stairs later pointed out in a confidential memorandum to Mac-
donald, was the whole West Indies trade of Nova Scotia.*8 Equally as important 
and also at stake was the entire industrial structure which had been created in 
the region under the aegis of the National Policy. 
The Maritimes by 1885 provided a striking illustration of the success of that 
policy. With less than one-fifth of the population of the Dominion, the region 
contained eight of the twenty-three Canadian cotton mills — including seven 
of the nineteen erected after 18794—, three of five sugar refineries, two of seven 
rope factories, one of three glass works, both of the Canadian steel mills, and 
six of the nation's twelve rolling mills. 
Although Stairs succeeded in his efforts to have the LCR. sugar freight rates 
reduced,50 the problem facing the Maritime entrepreneur was not one which 
could be solved simply by easier access to the larger central Canadian market; 
its cause was much more complex. In the cotton industry, for example, the 
Canadian business community had created industrial units with a production 
potential sufficient to supply the entire national market. In periods of recession 
47 J. F. Stairs to J. M. Pope. 10 September 1885. Macdonald Papers. 50080-5. Public Archives of 
Canada. 
48 J. F. Stairs to Macdonald. 5 February 1886. ibid.. volume 155. 
49 Monetary Times. 5 October 1888. 
50 Ibid., 12 February 1886. 
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many American cloth manufacturers were prepared to cut prices on exports 
to a level which vitiated the Canadian tariff; this enabled them to gain control 
of a considerable portion of the Canadian market. The problems of the cotton 
cloth manufacturers could have been solved by a further increase in the tariff 
— a politically undesirable answer—, by control of railway rates, or by a regu-
lated industrial output. 
From a Maritime regional viewpoint the second of these alternatives ap-
peared to be the most advantageous; the limitations of the tariff could then be 
accepted and, having attained geographic equality with Montreal through a 
regulated freight rate, the more efficient Maritime mills would soon control 
the Montreal market. Such was the hope; there was little possibility of its re-
alization. Such a general alteration in railway policy would have required sub-
sidization of certain geographic areas—districts constituting political minori-
ties — at the expense of the dominant political areas of the country, a prospect 
which the business community of Montreal and environs could hardly be ex-
pected to view with equanimity. Apart from the political difficulties of the 
situation, most Maritime manufactories suffered from two major organizational 
problems: the continued difficulty faced by community corporations in securing 
financing in the frequent periods of marginal business activity,51 and the fact that 
most firms depended upon Montreal wholesale houses to dispose of their extra-
regional exports" Short of a major shift in government railway or tariff policy, 
the only solution to the problem of markets which seemed to have any chance for 
success appeared to be the regulation of industrial production, a technique 
which was to bring into the Maritimes the Montreal interests which already 
controlled the major part of the distributive function in eastern Canada. 
Ill 
The entry of Montreal into the Maritime region was not a new phenomenon. 
With the completion of the Intercolonial Railway and the imposition of coal 
duties in 1879, Montreal railway entrepreneurs moved to control both the major 
rail systems of New Brunswick and the Nova Scotia coal fields. A syndicate 
headed by George Stephen and Donald Smith had purchased the New Brunswick 
Railroad from Alexander Gibson and the Hon. Isaac Burpee in 1880,*3 with the 
intention of extending it to Rivière du Loup. This system was expanded two 
years later by the purchase of the New Brunswick and Canada Railroad with 
the ultimate view of making St. John the winter port for Montreal. 
In the same year, another Montreal group headed by John McDougall, 
David Morrice and L.-A. Sénécal acquired from fifteen St. John bondholders, 
four-fifths of the bonds of the Springhill and Parrsboro Railroad and Mining 
51 See the problems faced by John Parks and the N. B. Cotton Mills. Parks Family Papers. F. 
New Brunswick Museum. 
52 Montreal Herald, 15 October 1883. 
53 Monetary Times. 8 October 1880. 
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Company,54 and followed this up in 1883 with the purchase of the Springhill 
Mining Company, the largest coal producer in Canada? The following year 
another syndicate acquired the International Mine at Sydney.5" The coal mine 
takeovers were designed to control and expand the output of this fuel source, 
partially in an effort to free the Canadian Pacific Railways from dependence 
upon the strike-prone American coal industry. By contrast, the entry of Mon-
treal interests into the manufacturing life of the Maritimes aimed to restrict 
output and limit expansion. 
The first serious attempts to regulate production occurred in the cotton 
industry. Although informal meetings of manufacturers had been held through-
out the mid-1880's, the business depression of 1886 and the threatened failure 
of several mills resulted in the organization of the first formal national trade 
association. Meeting in Montreal in the summer of 1886. representatives of 
sixteen mills, including four from the Maritimes, agreed to regulate production 
and to set standard minimum prices for commodities. The agreement was to 
be renegotiated yearly and each mill provided a bond as proof of good faith.57 
The arrangement at least stabilized the industry and the agreement was re-
newed in 1887. 
The collapse of the association the following year was precipitated by a 
standing feud between the two largest Maritime mills, the St. Croix at St. 
Stephen and the Gibson at Marysville. Alexander Gibson had long been the 
maverick of the organization, having refused to subscribe to the agreement in 
1886 and 1887. During this period he had severely injured his larger St. Stephen 
competitor in the Maritime market. By the time Gibson agreed to enter the 
association in 1888, the St. Croix mill, faced with bankruptcy, dropped out 
and reduced prices in an effort to dispose of its huge inventory. The Gibson 
mill followed suit. With two of the largest coloured cotton mills in the Domin-
ion selling without regulation, the controlled market system dissolved into 
chaos, and the association, both coloured and grey sections, disintegrated." 
The return to an unregulated market in the cotton industry continued for more 
than two years. A business upswing in 1889 mercifully saved the industry from 
what many manufacturers feared would be a general financial collapse. Even 
so, only the mills with the largest production potential, regardless of geographic 
location, escaped unscathed; most of the smaller plants were forced to close 
temporarily. 
In the summer of 1890 a Montreal group headed by A. F. Gault and David 
Morrice prepared the second attempt to regulate die cotton market. The tech-
nique was to be the corporate monopoly. The Dominion Cotton Mills Com-
pany, with a $5,000,000 authorized capital, was to bring all of the grey cotton 
54 Ibid., 15 December 1882. 
55 Ibid.. 8 June 1883. 
56 Ibid.. 16 November 1884. 
57 Ibid.. 13 August 1886: Canadian Manufacturer. 20 August 1887. 
58 Canadian Journal of Commerce. 7 September 1888. 
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producers under the control of a single directorate. In January 1891, David 
Morrice set out on a tour of Maritime cotton centres. On his first stop, at 
Halifax, he accepted transfer of the Nova Scotia Cotton Mill to the syndicate. 
the shareholders receiving $101,000 cash and $101,000 in bonds in the new 
corporation, a return of 25 cents on the dollar of their initial investment.59 The 
following day Morrice proceeded to Windsor, "to consummate the transfer of 
the factory there".80 and from there moved on to repeat the performance at 
Moncton. Fearful of total bankruptcy and hopeful that this stronger organiza-
tion would provide the stability that earlier efforts had failed to achieve, stock-
holders of the smaller community-oriented mills readily acquiesced to the new 
order. Although they lost heavily on their original investment, most owners 
accepted bonds in the new corporation in partial payment for their old stock. 
The first determined opposition to the cotton consolidation movement ap-
peared in St. John. Here. John H. Parks, founder and operator of the thirty-
year old New Brunswick Cotton Mill, had bought the bankrupt St. John Cotton 
firm in 1886 and had proceeded to operate both mills. Despite the perennial 
problem of financing, the Parks Mills represented one of the most efficient 
industrial operations in the Dominion, one which had won an international 
reputation for the quality of its product. The company's major markets were 
found in western Ontario, a fact which made the continued independence of 
the firm a particular menace to the combination. The firm's major weakness 
was its financial structure. Dependent upon the Bank of Montreal for his oper-
ating capital. Parks had found it necessary to borrow more heavily than usual 
during the winter of 1889-90. By mid-1890 his debts totalled $122,000? 
At this point two events occurred almost simultaneously: Parks refused to 
consider sale of the St. John Mills to the new corporation, and the Bank of 
Montreal, having ascertained that the Montreal syndicate would buy the mills 
from any seller, demanded immediate payment in full of the outstanding debts 
of the company ^  a most unusual procedure. Claiming a Montreal conspiracy 
to seize the company, Parks replied with an open letter to the dry goods mer-
chants of greater St. John. 
. . . I have made arrangements by which the mills of our company will be 
run to their fullest extent. 
These arrangements have been made in the face of the most determined 
efforts to have our business stopped, and our proprety sold out to the Mon-
treal syndicate which is endeavouring to control the Cotton Trade of Cana-
da . . . . I now propose to continue to keep our mills in operation as a St. 
59 Thomas Kenny in Canada. House of Commons. Debates. 1893. p. 2522. 
60 Monetary Times. 16 Januar, 1891. 
61 St. John Globe. 1 May 1891. 
62 E. S. Clouston to Jones. 25 April 1891. Bank of Montreal. General Managers Letterbooks. vol. 
8. Public Archives of Canada. 
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John industry, free from all outside control. I would therefore ask you gentle-
men. as far as your power, to support me in this undertaking — 
It remains with you to assist the Wholesale Houses in distributing the goods 
made in St. John in preference to those of outside manufacture so long as 
the quality and price of the home goods is satisfactory. 
The closing of our mills. . . would be a serious calamity to the community, 
and vou, by your support can assist materially in preventing it. I believe vou 
will* 
Parks' appeal to community loyalty saved his firm. When the bank fore-
closed the mortgage which it held as security for its loans. Mr. Justice A. L. 
Palmer of the New Brunswick Supreme Court placed the firm in receivership 
under his control until the case was resolved. Over the strongest objections 
of the bank, and on one legal pretext after another, the judge kept the mill 
in receivership for nearly two years.64 In the meantime he forced the bank to 
continue the provision of operating capital for the mill's operations, and in 
conjunction with the receiver, a young Fredericton lawyer, H. H. McLean, 
proceeded to run an efficient and highly profitable business. When the decision 
was finally rendered in December 1892, the firm was found to have cleared 
profits of $150,000 during the period of the receivership. Parks was able to use 
the funds to repay the bank debts and the mill continued under local control*5 
The St. John experience was unique. Gault and Morrice organized the 
Canadian Coloured Cotton Company, sister consolidation to the Dominion 
Cotton Mills, in 1891. The St. Croix Mill entered the new organization without 
protest early in 1892,66 and even the Gibson Mill, while retaining its separate 
corporate structure, agreed to market its entire output through the new con-
solidation. By 1893 only the St. John Mills and the small Yarmouth plant re-
mained in the hands of regional entrepreneurs. 
The fate of the Maritime cotton mills was parallelled in the sugar industry. 
In 1890 a syndicate of Scottish merchants, incorporated under English laws as 
the Halifax Sugar Refinery Ltd.. bought up the English-owned Woodside Re-
finery of Halifax.67 The ultimate aim of the Scottish group was to consolidate 
the sugar industry into a single corporate entity similar to Dominion Cotton. 
Failing in this effort because of the parliamentary outcry against combines, 
they turned their efforts to regional consolidation. With the assistance of John 
F. Stairs. M.P., they were able, in 1894, to secure an act of incorporation as 
the Acadia Sugar Refineries which was to amalgamate the three Maritime 
63 15 December 1890. Parks Papers. Scrapbook 2. New Brunswick Museum. 
64 Clouston to Jones. 13. 22 April. 23 May 1891. Bank of Montreal. General Managers Letter-
books. vol. 8. Public Archives of Canada. 
65 St. John Sun. 28 December 1892. 
66 Monetary Times. 18 March 1892. 
67 Ibid.. 24 October 189(). 
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firms. Unlike the Cotton Union, the new consolidation worked in the interests 
of the regional entrepreneurs, the stock holders of all three refineries receiving 
full value for their holdings. Equally important, the management of the new 
concern remained in the hands of Thomas Kenny. M.P. 
The consolidation movement of the early 1890's swept most of the other 
major Maritime manufactories. In some cases local entrepreneurs managed to 
retain a voice in the direction of the new mergers — John Stairs, for example, 
played a prominent role on the directorate of the Consumers Cordage Com-
pany which swept the Halifax and St. John rope concerns into a new seven-
company amalgamation in 1890!* On the other hand, the Nova Scotia Glass 
Company of New Glasgow disappeared entirely in the Diamond Glass consol-
idation of that same year.9" On the whole, saving only the iron and steel pro-
ducts, the confectionery and the staple export industries, control of all mass 
consumption industries in the Maritimes had passed to outside interests by 
1895. Thus, in large measure the community manufactory which had dominated 
the industrial growth of the 1880's ceased to exist in the 1890's. Given the nature 
of the market of the period, some degree of central control probably was in-
evitable. The only question at stake was whether it would be a control effected 
by political or financial means, and if the latter, from which centre it would 
emanate. 
The failure of any Maritime metropolis to achieve this control was partly 
a result of geography and partly a failure of entrepreneurial leadership. The 
fear of being left on the fringes of a national marketing system had been amply 
illustrated by the frenetic efforts of the St. John and Halifax business com-
munities to promote political policies which would link the Canadian market-
ing system to an Atlantic structure with the Maritime ports serving as the con-
necting points.70 
The question of entrepreneurial failure is more difficult to document. In 
part the great burst of industrial activity which marked the early 1880's was 
the last flowering of an older generation of lumbermen and wholesale shippers. 
Having failed to achieve their position as the link between central Canada and 
Europe, and faced with the dominant marketing and financial apparatus of the 
Montreal community, they drew back and even participated in the transfer of 
control. This failure is understandable in the smaller communities; it is more 
difficult to explain in the larger. In the latter case it may well be attributable 
to the perennial failure of most Maritime communities to maintain a continuity 
of industrial elites. The manufacturing experience of most families was limited 
to a single generation: Thomas Kenny's father was a wholesale merchant, his 
son a stock broker. John F. Stairs was the son of a merchant and the father of 
(S8 Canadian Journal of Commerce. 22 March 1895. 
69 Monetary Times, 24 October 1890. 
70 Ibid.. 12 June 1885. 22 April 1887. 22 August 1902; Minutes of the St. John Board of Trade. 
1 December 1879. 8 November 1886. New Brunswick Museum. 
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a lawyer. Even in such a distinguished industrial family as that of John Parks, 
a second generation manufacturer, the son attended the Royal Military College 
and then entered the Imperial service. Commerce and the professions pro-
vided a much more stable milieu, and while many participants in both of these 
activities were prepared to make the occasional excursion into manufacturing, 
usually as part of a dual role, few were willing to make a permanent and sole 
commitment to an industrial vocation. 
IV 
The lesson brought home to the Maritime entrepreneur by the industrial 
experience between 1879 and 1895 was that geography would defeat any at-
tempt to compete at parity with a central Canadian enterprise. In response to 
this lesson, the truncated industrial community of the region turned increas-
ingly to those resource industries in which geography gave them a natural 
advantage over their central Canadian counterparts. In the 1890's the thrust 
of Maritime industrial growth was directed toward the processing and manu-
facturing of primary steel and of iron and steel products. In part, since these 
enterprises constituted much of the industrial machinery remaining in the 
hands of regional entrepreneurs, there was little choice in this development. 
At the same time. Nova Scotia contained most of the active coal and iron 
deposits in the Dominion and had easy access to the rich iron ore deposits at 
Belle Isle. In any event, most competition in these industries came from west-
ern Ontario rather than Montreal, and the latter was thus a potential market. 
Iron and steel development was not new to the region. Efforts at primary 
steel making had been undertaken successfully at New Glasgow since 1882. 
Yet production there was limited and would continue so until a more favour-
able tariff policy guaranteed a stable market for potential output. Such a policy 
was begun in 1887 with the passage of the "iron" tariff. Generally labeled as a 
Nova Scotia tariff designed to make that province "the Pennsylvania of Cana-
da"71 and New Glasgow "the Birmingham of the country"? the act provided 
an effective protection of $3.50 a ton for Canadian-made iron, and imposed 
heavy duties on a variety of iron and steel products!3 Protection for the in-
dustry was completed in 1894 when the duty on scrap iron, considered a raw 
material by secondary iron manufacturers, was raised from $2 to $4 a ton, and 
most rolling mills were forced to use Nova Scotia-made bar iron rather than 
imported scrap? 
The growth of the New Glasgow industries parallelled this tariff development. 
In 1889 the Nova Scotia Steel Company was united with the Nova Scotia Forge 
Company to form a corporation capable of manufacturing both primary steel 
71 Monetary Times, 20 May 1887. 
72 The Canadian Journal of Commerce, 29 April 1887. 
73 Canada. Statutes. 50-1 Victoria C. 39. 
74 Simon J. MacLean. The Tariff History of Canada (Toronto. 1895). p. 37. 
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and iron and steel products. In the same year, to provide the community with 
its own source of pig iron, a group of Nova Scotia Steel shareholders organized 
the New Glasgow Iron, Coal and Railroad Company with a capital of 
$1,000,000.75 Five years later, following the enactment of the scrap iron duty, 
New Glasgow acquired the rich Wabana iron ore deposits at Belle Isle — some 
eighty-three acres covered with ore deposits so thick they could be cut from 
the surface. This was followed the next year by the union of the Nova Scotia 
Steel and Forge and the New Glasgow Iron companies into a $2,060,000 cor-
poration, the Nova Scotia Steel Company. Containing its own blast and open 
hearth furnaces, rolling mills, forges, foundries, and machine shops, the firm 
represented the most fully integrated industrial complex in the country. The 
process was completed in 1900 when the company acquired the Sydney Coal 
Mines on Cape Breton Island, developed new steel mills in that area and re-
organized as the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company with a $7,000,000 cap-
ital79 
The development of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal corporation had begun 
under the direction of a cabal of Pictou County Scottish Nova Scotians, a 
group which was later enlarged to include a few prominent Halifax business-
men. Aside from Graham Fraser, its leading members included James D. Mc-
Gregor, James C. MacGregor, Colonel Thomas Cantley, and John F. Stairs. 
All four were third generation Nova Scotians, the first three from New Glas-
gow. Saving only Cantley, all were members of old mercantile families. Senator 
McGregor, a merchant, was a grandson of the Rev. Dr. James McGregor, one 
of the founders of the Presbyterian Church in Nova Scotia; MacGregor was 
a partner in the large shipbuilding concern of Senator J. W. Carmichael, a 
prominent promoter of Nova Scotia Steel. Cantley was the only member of 
the group of proletarian origins. Like Graham Fraser, he spent a lifetime in 
the active service of the company, having entered the newly established Nova 
Scotia Forge Company in 1873 at the age of sixteen. Promoted to sales manager 
of the amalgamated Nova Scotia Steel Company in 1885, he had been respons-
ible for the introduction of Wabana ore into England and Germany. In 1902 
he succeeded Graham Fraser as general manager of the corporation.77 
Aside from its value to the New Glasgow area, the Nova Scotia Steel Com-
pany was of even greater significance as a supplier of iron and steel to a variety 
of foundries, car works and machine mills in the region. Because of its unique 
ability to provide primary, secondary and tertiary steel and iron manufactures, 
it was supplying most of the Maritime iron and steel needs by 1892.78 In this 
75 Nova Scotia's Industrial Centre:New Glasgow, Stellarton, Westville, Trenton. The Birthplace 
of Steel in Canada (n.p., 1916), pp. 45-6. 
76 Monetary Times. 9 March 1900: Industrial Canada, 20 July 1901. 
77 WWW, VI & VII, pp. 927, 1075-6. 
78 R. M. Guy, "Industrial Development and Urbanization of Pictou Co.. N. S. to 1900" (unpub-
lished M.A. thesis, Acadia University, 1962). pp. 120-3. 
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respect, the industrial experience of the 1890's differed considerably from that 
of the previous decade. It was not characterized by the development of new 
industrial structures, but rather by the expansion of older firms which had 
served purely local markets for some time and expanded in response to the 
demand created by the tariff changes of the period.n 
The centres of the movement were at New Glasgow, Amherst and St. John, 
all on the main lines of the Intercolonial or Canadian Pacific railroads. At New 
Glasgow, the forge and foundry facilities of the Nova Scotia Steel Company 
consumed half the company's iron and steel output. At Amherst. Nathaniel 
Curry (later Senator) and his brother-in-law, John Rhodes, continued the ex-
pansion of the small woodworking firm they had established in 1877. gradually 
adding a door factory, a rolling mill, a railroad car plant and an axle factory, 
and in 1893 bought out the Harris Car Works and Foundry of St. John!0 At 
the time of its incorporation in 1902, Rhodes. Curry & Company was one of 
the largest secondary iron manufacturing complexes in the Dominion!1 Curry's 
industrial neighbour at Amherst was David Robb. Son of an Amherst foundry 
owner, Robb had been trained in engineering at the Stevens Institute of New 
Jersey and then had entered his father's foundry. Specializing in the develop-
ment of precision machinery, he expanded his activities into Massachusetts in 
the 1890's and finally merged his firm into the International Engineering Works 
of South Framingham of which he remained managing director.82 
If under the aegis of a protective government policy the iron and steel indus-
try of the Maritimes was rapidly becoming a viable proposition for local entre-
preneurs, it was also increasingly attracting the interest of both Boston and 
Montreal business interests. There was a growing feeling that, once a recipro-
cal coal agreement was made between Canada and the United States. Nova 
Scotia coal would replace the more expensive Pennsylvania product in the 
New England market. Added to this inducement was the fact that Nova Scotia 
provided the major fuel source on the Montreal market — the city actually 
consumed most of the coal produced in the Cape Breton fields!3 With its 
almost unlimited access routes and its strategic water position midway be-
tween Boston and Montreal, Nova Scotia seemed an excellent area for invest-
ment. 
In 1893 a syndicate headed by H. M. Whitney of Boston and composed of 
Boston, New York and Montreal businessmen, including Donald Smith. W. C. 
79 Canadian Manufacturer, 20 April 1894. 
80 Monetary Times, 30 June 1893. 
81 Industrial Canada. March, 1910: Canadian Men and Women of the Time (1912). p. 290. 
82 CCB. II, p. 183: CBD. II. pp. 506-7: WWW, VI & VII, p. 997; Canadian Men and Women of 
the Time ( 1912). p. 947. 
83 Monetary Times. 26 November 18%. The St. Lawrence ports imported 88.000 tons of British 
and American coal in 18%. and 706.000 tons of Nova Scotia coal. The transport of this commodity 
provided the basis for the Nova Scotia merchant marine of the period. 
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Van Home and Hugh McLennan, negotiated a 119-year lease with the Nova 
Scotia government for most of the existing coal fields on Cape Breton Island!4 
The new Dominion Coal Company came into formal being in March of that 
year, with David MacKeen (later Senator) as director and general manager, and 
John S. McLennan (later Senator) as director and treasurer. The son of a Scot-
tish-born mine owner and member of the legislative council, MacKeen had been 
an official and principal stockholder in the Caledonia Coal Company which 
had been absorbed in the new consolidation.89 McLennan was the second son 
of Hugh McLennan of Montreal, a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, 
and one of the very few entrepreneurs who made the inter-regional transfer 
in this period.88 The success of the Dominion Coal syndicate and the growing 
feeling that the Canadian government was determined to create a major 
Canadian primary steel industry led Whitney in 1899 to organize the Dominion 
Iron & Steel Company. The date was significant. Less than two years earlier 
the government had announced its intention to extend bounty payments to steel 
made from imported ores.87 The $15,000,000 capital of the new company was 
easily raised, largely on the Canadian stock market,89 and by 1902 the company 
was employing 4,000 men in its four blast and ten steel furnace works8* Gra-
ham Fraser was induced to leave Nova Scotia Steel to become general mana-
ger of the new corporation?0 and J. H. Plummer, assistant general manager 
of the Bank of Commerce, was brought from Toronto as president. 
The primacy of American interests in both the Dominion Steel and Dominion 
Coal companies was rapidly replaced by those of Montreal and Toronto after 
1900. The sale of stocks added a strong Toronto delegation to the directorate 
of the steel company in 1901.91 In that same year James Ross, the Montreal 
street railway magnate, bought heavily into the coal corporation, re-organized 
its management and retained control of the firm until 1910. 
V 
The increasing reliance on the stock market as a technique for promoting 
and securing the necessary financial support to develop the massive Nova 
84 Ibid.. 3 February 1893. 
85 Canadian Men and Women of the Time (1912). pp. 698-9; WWW, VI & VII. p. 1118. 
86 WWW. VI & VII, p. 1322. 
87 Donald, however, argues that Whitney had been determined to go into steei production even 
if no bounty had been granted. See Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, p. 203. 
88 Partly, the Canadian Journal of Commerce (15 March 1901) suggested, on the promise of the 
promoters that the Company would receive bonuses of $8,000,000 in its first six years of operation. 
89 Industrial Canada. May. 1902. 
90 J. H. Plummer to B. E. Walker. 3 December 1903. Walker Papers. University of Toronto 
Archives. 
91 Annual Financial Review, I (1901). p. 92; III (1903), pp. 158-160. 
92 Monetary Times, 3 August 1907. 
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Scotia steel corporations emphasized the growing shift from industrial to finan-
cial capitalism. Centred on the Montreal stock market, the new movement 
brought to the control of industrial corporations men who had neither a com-
munal nor a vocational interest in the concern. 
In emulation of, and possibly in reaction to the Montreal experience, a group 
within the Halifax business and professional communities scrambled to erect 
the financial structure necessary to this undertaking. The city already possess-
ed some of the elements of this structure. The Halifax stock exchange had 
existed on an informal basis since before Confederation.93 The city's four 
major banking institutions—the Nova Scotia, the Union, the Merchants (which 
subsequently became the Royal Bank of Canada) and the Peoples — were 
among the soundest in the Dominion. The development of Halifax as a major 
centre for industrial finance began in 1894, at the height of the first Montreal-
based merger movement, when a syndicate headed by J. F. Stairs founded the 
Eastern Trust Company.94 The membership of this group was indicative of 
the change that was occurring in the Halifax business elite. Although it con-
tained representatives of the older mercantile group, such as Stairs, T. E. Kenny 
and Adam Burns, it also included manufacturers and coalman, notably J. W. 
Allison and David McKeen, a stockbroker, J. C. MacKintosh, and lawyers 
such as Robert L. Borden and Robert E. Harris. 
Until his death in 1904, the personification of the new Halifax finance cap-
italism was John Stairs. It was Stairs who arranged the organization of Acadia 
Sugar in 1894, who initiated the merger of the Union bank of Halifax with the 
Bank of Windsor in 1899, and who led the Halifax business community back 
into its traditional imperium in the Caribbean with the organization of the 
Trinidad Electric and Demerara Electric corporations.95 After 1900, it was 
Stairs who. demonstrated to this same group the possibilities for industrial 
finance existing within the Maritimes. With the assistance of his young secre-
tary, Max Aitken, and through the medium of his own holding company, Royal 
Securities, he undertook the re-organization of a number of firms in the re-
gion, most notably the Alexander Gibson Railroad and Manufacturing Com-
pany which was re-capitalized at 56,000,000!* The scope of his interests, and 
the changes which had been wrought in the Maritime business community in 
the previous twenty-five years, were perhaps best illustrated in the six corpor-
ation presidencies which Stairs held in his lifetime, five of them at his death 
in 1904: Consumers Cordage, Nova Scotia Steel, Eastern Trust, Trinidad Elec-
tric, Royal Securities, and Dalhousie University. 
93 Ibid., 17 April 1903. 
94 Ibid., 23 February 1894. 
95 Annual Financial Review, XXIII (1923). pp. 682. 736. 
% Monetary Times. 5 December 1902. 
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Yet, while promotion of firms such as Stanfield's Woollens of Truro con-
stituted a fertile field of endeavour,97 the major industrial interest of the 
Halifax finance capitalists was the Nova Scotia Steel Company. In its search 
for additional capital resources after 1900. the entrepreneurial strength of this 
firm was rapidly broadened from its New Glasgow base. The principal new 
promoters of the company were Halifaxmen. notably James Allison. George 
Campbell and Robert Harris. The New Brunswick-born nephew of the founder 
of Mount Allison University, Allison had entered the chocolate and spice 
manufactory of John Mott & Company of Halifax in 1871, and had eventually 
been admitted to a partnership in the firm. He had invested heavily in several 
Nova Scotia industries and sat on the directorates of Stanfields Woollens, the 
Eastern Trust, and the Bank of Nova Scotia in addition to Nova Scotia Steel. ** 
George Campbell, the son of a Scottish gentleman, had entered the service 
of a Halifax steamship agency as a young man and ultimately became its head. 
Like Allison he was deeply involved in a number of Nova Scotian firms in-
cluding Stanfields, the Silliker Car of Amherst, the Eastern Trust and the 
Bank of Nova Scotia." 
By far the most significant figure in the Nova Scotia Steel Corporation after 
Stairs' death was Mr. Justice Robert Harris. The Annapolis-born scion of a 
Loyalist family, Harris shared the same antecedents as the Moncton and St. 
John entrepreneurs of the same name. After reading law with Sir John Thomp-
son, he was called to the Nova Scotia bar in 1882 and rapidly became one of 
the leading legal figures in the province. In 1892 he moved his practice to 
Halifax and there became intimately involved in the corporate promotions of 
the period, ultimately serving on die directorates of thirteen major corpora-
tions including the Eastern Trust, Eastern Car, Bank of Nova Scotia, Maritime 
Telegraph and Telephone. Acadia Sugar, Robb Engineering, Brandram-Hen-
derson Paint, and held the presidencies of Nova Scotia Steel, Eastern Trust, 
Demerara Electric, and Trinidad Electric.100 
Despite the continuing need for additional capital, the Nova Scotia Steel 
Company found little difficulty obtaining most of this support from the Hali-
fax business community.101 In turn, the corporation remained one of the most 
efficiently organized industrial firms in the country. In striking contrast to the 
larger Dominion Steel enterprise, Nova Scotia Steel's financial position re-
mained strong, its performance solid and its earnings continuous. It was gen-
97 Ibid., 22 April 1911. 
98 Canadian Men and Women of the Time {1912), p. 19; WWW, VI & VII, p. 762; Annual Financial 
Review, HI (1903). pp. 174-6. 
99 Canadian Men and Women of the Time 11912). p. 192; WWW. VI & VII. p. 8()3. 
100 Canadian Men and Women of the Time (1912), p. 505; WWW, VI &VII, p. 1107; Annual 
Financial Review, III (1903). pp. 174-6. 
101 Most of the stock in this concern was held by Nova Scotians who also bought up two-thirds 
of the Sl.500.000 bond which the company put out in 1904. L. M. Jones to B. E. Walker, 5 August 
1904. Walker Papers: Monetary Times, 15 August 1902. 
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erally credited with being the only major steel company which could have 
maintained its dividend payments without the aid of federal bounties.'02 
As the first decade of the twentieth century wore to a close, the Halifax 
business elite appeared to have succeeded in establishing a financial hegemony 
in the industrial life of an area centred in eastern Nova Scotia and extending 
outward into both southern New Brunswick and peninsular Nova Scotia. Yet, 
increasingly, that hegemony was being challenged by the burgeoning consol-
idation movement emanating from Montreal. The most serious threat was 
posed in 1909 when Max Aitken. with Montreal now as the centre for his Royal 
Securities Corporation, arranged the amalgamation of the Rhodes. Curry 
Company of Amherst with the Canada Car. and the Dominion Car and Foundry 
companies of Montreal to form the Canadian Car and Foundry Company. The 
union marked a triumph as much for Nathaniel Curry as for Aitken — he 
emerged with the presidency and with nearly $3,000,000 of the $8,500,000 
capital stock of the new corporation.103 The move was a blow to the Halifax 
capitalists, however, as it placed the largest car manufactory in the country, 
an Amherst plant employing 1,300 men and annually producing $5,000,000 in 
iron and steel products,104 firmly in the Montreal orbit of the Drummonds 
and the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation. Tension was heightened by 
the feeling that this manoeuvre was a prelude to the creation of a railroad car 
monopoly. The reaction was swift. To prevent the takeover of the other Am-
herst car works, the Silliker Company, a Halifax-based syndicate bought up 
most of the Silliker stock and organized a greatly expanded company. Nova 
Scotia Car Works, with a $2,625,000 capital.105 The following year Nova Scotia 
Steel organized its own $2,000,000 car subsidiary, the Eastern Car Company. 
The contest between Montreal and Halifax finance capitalism reached its 
climax at the annual meeting of the Nova Scotia Steel Company of New Glas-
gow in April, 1910. Fresh from the triumph of the Dominion Coal and Steel 
merger, Montreal stockbrokers Rudolphe Forget and Max Aitken determined 
to extend the union to include the smaller steel firm, a proposal which the 
Scotia Steel president, Robert Harris, flatly refused to consider. Arguing that 
the firm was stagnating and that a more dynamic leadership in a reorganized 
corporation would yield greater returns, Forget launched a major effort to 
acquire proxies with a view to taking control from the Nova Scotia directors. 
Using the facilities of the Montreal Stock Exchange, he bought large quantities 
of Scotia stock at increasingly higher prices, an example followed by Robert 
Harris and his associates at Halifax. At the April meeting, Harris offered Forget 
a minority of the seats on the directorate: Forget refused. In the voting which 
102 Monetary Times. 9 March 1907. 
103 Ibid.. 8 January 1910. 
104 Industrial Canada, August. 1913. 
105 Monetary Times. 29 October 1910. 
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followed, the Montreal interests were narrowly beaten. The Monetary Times, 
in a masterpiece of distortion, described this victory as the triumph of "the 
law . . . over the market place"!06 and proclaimed that "New Glasgow prefers 
coal dust to that of the stock exchange floor'."07 In fact, it marked a victory, 
albeit a temporary one. for New Glasgow industrial capitalism and Halifax 
financial capitalism. More important, it marked the high point of a late-devel-
oping effort on the part of the Halifax business community to create an in-
dustrial region structured on that Atlantic metropolis. It was a short-lived 
triumph. By 1920 the Halifax group made common cause with their Montreal 
and London Counterparts in the organization of the British Empire Steel Cor-
poration. a gigantic consolidation containing both the Dominion and the Nova 
Scotia Steel companies. This event marked both the final nationalization of 
the region's major industrial potential and the failure of its entrepreneurs to 
maintain control of any significant element in the industrial section of the 
regional economy. 
VI 
The Maritimes had entered Canada very much as a foreign colony. As the 
least integrated part of the Canadian economy, it was the region most depend-
ent upon and most influenced by those policies designated to create an inte-
grated national state. The entrepreneurs of the 1880's were capable men, 
vividly aware of the problems involved in the transition from an Atlantic to a 
continental economy. The tragedy of the industrial experiment in the Mari-
times was that the transportation lines which linked the region to its new me-
tropolis altered the communal arrangement of the entire area; they did not 
merely establish a new external frame of reference, they re-cast the entire 
internal structure. The Maritimes had never been a single integrated organic 
unit; it was. in fact, not a "region" at all. but a number of British communities 
clustered on the Atlantic fringe, each with its separate lines of communication 
and its several metropolises — lines that were water-borne, flexible and chang-
ing. In this sense the railroad with its implications of organic unity, its inflex-
ibility, and its assumption that there was a metropolitan point at which it could 
end, provided an experience entirely alien to the Maritime tradition. The 
magnitude of this problem was demonstrated in the initial attempts at indus-
trialization; they all occurred in traditional communities ideally located for 
the Atlantic market, but in the most disadvantaged positions possible for a 
continental one. 
Central to the experience was the failure of a viable regional metropolis to 
arise to provide the financial leadership and market alternative. With its power-
ful mercantile interests and its impressive banking institutions Halifax could 
most easily have adopted to this role, but its merchants preferred, like their 
106 Ibid.. 2 April 1910. 
107 Ibid.. 9 April 1910. 
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Boston counterparts, to invest their large fortunes in banks and American 
railroad stocks than to venture them on building a new order. Only later, with 
the advent of regional resource industries, did that city play the role of finan-
cial metropolis. 
Lacking any strong regional economic centre, the Maritime entrepreneur 
inevitably sought political solutions to the structural problems created by the 
National Policy; he consistently looked to the federal government for aid 
against all external threats and to his local governments for aid against Canad-
ians. Since the regional politician was more able to influence a hostile environ-
ment than was the regional businessman, the latter frequently became both. 
In many respects the National Policy simply represented to the entrepreneur 
a transfer from a British to a Canadian commercial empire. Inherent in most 
of his activities was the colonial assumption that he could not really control 
his own destiny, that, of necessity, he would be manipulated by forces beyond 
his control. Thus he produced cotton cloth for the central Canadian metropo-
lis in precisely the same manner as he had produced timber and ships for the 
British. In so doing he demonstrated considerable initiative and considerable 
courage, for the truly surprising aspect of the whole performance was that he 
was able, using his limited community resources, to produce such a complex 
and diversified industrial potential during the last two decades of the nine-
teenth century. The inability of the Canadian market to consume his output 
was as much a failure of the system as of the entrepreneur; the spectacle of 
a metropolis which devoured its own children had been alien to the Maritime 
colonial experience. Ultimately, perhaps inevitably, the regional entrepreneur 
lost control to external forces which he could rarely comprehend, much less 
master. 
